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We have only begun to understand the experiences of the 15 million immigrants who 
settled in the U.S. after 1965.  While many studies have examined specific immigrant groups or 
considered the policy implications of the new immigration, fewer have analyzed how the new 
immigrants are helping to reweave the economic, social, and political fabric of American cities. 
In particular, research is only now beginning to focus on the crucial second generation coming 
of age.  Yet their experience will determine how the new groups, especially those deemed "non-
white" by traditional North American racial definitions, will be incorporated into U.S. society, how 
that incorporation compares to earlier immigrants,  whether the children of relatively successful 
immigrants will remain in ethnic niches or will branch out, and how the new immigration will 
affect our social, political, and cultural institutions and identities. 
Initial reflections on their fate give cause for concern.  Gans (1992) speculates that 
second generation immigrants who are restricted to poor inner city schools, bad jobs, and 
shrinking economic niches will experience downward mobility.  Portes and Zhou (1993) 
postulate a "segmented assimilation" in which some second generation youth hold on to an 
immigrant identity in order to avoid being classified with American blacks or Puerto Ricans, 
while others face racial discrimination and develop an "adversarial stance" toward the dominant 
society.  Rumbaut (1997) tells us that as second generation immigrants become more 
American, they watch more television and do less homework, eat more junk food and become 
less fit, resent “old country” parental strictness and become entangled in the dangers of the 
streets.    We do not know the longer term meaning of these trends or whether they truly 
describe the trajectory of the new immigrant second generation.
We therefore believe the time has come to undertake a detailed study of the school 
experience, labor market outcomes, and social incorporation of the leading edge of the second 
generation as it enters adulthood.  Specifically, we are now in the middle stages of study which 
will include a) a large scale telephone survey, b) in-depth, open-ended, in-person follow-up 
interviews with a subsample of survey respondents, and c) strategically positioned 
ethnographies. We are studying young adults aged 18-32 born to post-1965 immigrant parents 
in the United States (the second generation) or who were born abroad but arrived in the U.S. by 
age 12 and mainly grew up here (the so-called “1.5 generation”).  We focus on the largest 
groups from four major streams of immigration:  Anglophone West Indians, Dominicans, 
Chinese and Russian Jews.  For added analytic power we compare the Dominican sample with 
one of young adults from Colombian, Ecuadoran, and Peruvian backgrounds, and we 
oversample the Chinese so as to insure the representation of both those whose parents came 
from mainland China and those with whose parents emigrated from  Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
elsewhere in East Asia.   We compare the five second generation groups with native born 
white, black, and mainland born Puerto Rican young adults born to native parents.   We chose 
a lower age limit of 18 as the practical minimum for leaving school and entering the labor force 
and an upper limit of 32, the oldest a native child born of post-1965 immigrants could be in 
1997 (when we originally planned to begin the survey).  
Our study will provide data to test the following hypotheses raised by the scholarship on 
immigrant incorporation, assimilation, and the new second generation:   
 1. Economic restructuring has had differential effects on the labor market opportunities for 
second generation and native born young adults, controlling for race; groups where 
parental educational attainment and economic position have been higher and social 
networks stronger will produce better outcomes for the second generation.  
 2. Systematically different levels of human, social, and cultural capital, and neighborhood 
contexts will also differentially affect the school experiences of the native and second 
generation groups.  Parental and second generation participation in economic or cultural 
"ethnic enclaves" forestalls some negative aspects of assimilation and sustains 
"immigrant advantages" for the second generation.
 3. Racial discrimination will differentiate the way various second generation groups 
construct self-identification and civic inclusion.  "Assimilation" into "black America" or 
"Latino America" will produce different educational, labor market, and cultural outcomes 
than for those who are not so classified.  
 5. Changing gender relations have a differential affect on individual outcomes among the 
second generation.  Second generation women will have an easier time than second 
generation men in “becoming American” while maintaining ethnic ties. 
 6. Concentrated urban poverty and societal disinvestment in urban education will have a 
differential negative impact on second generation young adults growing up in poverty 
neighborhoods.  
In the wake of dramatic changes to family form, women’s labor force participation, the 
economy, and the labor market, evidence gathered by this study will enable us to understand 
how this crucial cohort will define the meaning of immigrant assimilation in the twenty-first 
century.  
Until recently, scholarly work on the children of post-1965 immigrants was largely 
speculative (i.e. Erie 1988, Gans 1992).  However, an emerging body of work has sought to 
extrapolate future adult patterns of incorporation from the experiences of second generation 
children and teenagers (Gibson 1989, Portes and Zhou 1993, Fernandez-Kelly and Schauffler 
1996, Portes and Schauffler 1996, Zhou and Bankston 1996, Rumbaut 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 
1997a).  Qualitative and ethnographic studies have also been made of second generation 
young adults that highlight generational transitions within immigrant communities (see Waters 
1996a,b, Bacon 1994, 1996, Suarez-Orozco 1995, Smith 1994, Grasmuck and Pessar 1993). 
Several quantitative analyses of the second generation have been made on the basis of the 
1990 census (Hirshman 1996, Jensen and Chiose 1996, Landale and Oropesa, 1995). Kao and 
Tienda (1995) studied immigrant youth and the second generation, using the NELS longitudinal 
data set. (For an overview of these studies see also Zhou 1997). What this emerging literature 
lacks, and indeed what could not have taken place until the present, is a comparative study of 
second generation young adults as participants in higher education, the labor force, and the 
community. 
In this paper we use the Current Population Survey data to paint a broad picture of the 
demography of the second generation and the importance and distinctiveness of New York as a 
strategic research site to examine them.  We then describe the geographic distribution of the 
second generation in New York and its suburbs and discuss the choices we made in devising a 
sampling plan to study the young adult second generation.  Finally, we describe the current 
state of the project and our methodological and substantive findings from the pilot stage of the 
study.
A Demographic Overview of the Second Generation
The March 1998 Current Population Survey tells us that 26.3 million of the nation’s 
268.3 million residents (or 9.79 percent) are immigrants, the highest percentage in many 
decades.1  Of equal significance, as Table 1 shows, 28.1 million more individuals (or 10.5 
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The March 1998 Annual Demographic Supplement of the CPS provides the most recent 
data available on overall national population and labor force characteristics, but does not ask 
about political participation.  This foreign born total excludes approximately 2.4 million people 
percent of the U.S. total) were born in the U.S. but had at least one foreign-born parent..2 Put 
another way, second generation immigrants constitute 12.2 percent, or one out of every eight 
people, of all those born within the U.S.   The combined first and second generation--the 
immigrant stock--make up one-fifth of the nation’s total population.   The components of the 
immigrant stock population will continue to rise, as immigration remains at a high level, more 
immigrants become naturalized citizens, the relatively high level of immigrant fertility results in 
more native born children, and the young second generation comes of age.  The growth of the 
new immigrant second generation will be offset only by the passing of older, white first and 
second generation individuals who arrived just before after World War II or whose parents 
arrived at the end of the last wave of migration or around World War II.  (Approximately 12.4 
percent of the current foreign born population arrived before 1965.)
Were they considered a single group, the nation’s immigrant stock population would far 
exceed the size of the nation’s native stock black and Hispanic populations, which together 
amount to about 15 percent of the national population.  Moreover, their present and future 
influence on the nation’s cultural and political development is magnified by their concentration in 
six states that loom large in popular culture and the electoral college (California, Illinois, Florida, 
New York, New Jersey, and Texas).  Within these states, they are further concentrated in the 
largest metropolitan areas.  Table 2 shows that first and second generation immigrants make 
up 42.1 percent of the population in metropolitan New York, 51.6 percent of metropolitan Los 
Angeles, 40.1 percent of the Bay Area, and almost 60% of Miami.  Even in large metropolitan 
areas with relatively low immigration, such as Chicago, they make up more than a quarter of 
the population.  Indeed, these eleven CMSAs contain one-third of the national population, but 
born abroad to U.S. citizen parents, who are counted in the tables as native stock.
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The CPS total population figure excluded members of the military and people living in 
group quarters, such as prisons, hospitals, and college dorms.
58.6 percent of the immigrant first and second generation.  Within these metropolitan areas, 
first and second generation immigrants are further concentrated in the central cities. .
The geographic distribution of this second generation population lies in between that of 
first generation immigrants and the native stock population, but closer to the former. 
Immigrants are highly concentrated in the New York metropolitan area and five other “gateway 
cities,” Los Angeles, San Francisco, Houston, Chicago, and Miami.  Within these metropolitan 
areas, they are also heavily concentrated in the central cities.  On the other hand, native born 
people with native born parents overwhelmingly reside outside these metropolitan areas.  As 
Table 3 shows, 17 percent of first generation non-citizen immigrants live in the New York metro 
area, with 35 percent more in the five other gateway metro areas, for a total of 52 percent, while 
only 5 percent of the native stock population lives in New York and only 10 percent in the 
gateway CMSAs, for a total of 15 percent.  Meanwhile, New York City has 6 percent of the 
nation’s second generation immigrants, the remainder of its metropolitan area another 8 
percent, the gateway cities hold 9 percent, and their surrounding metropolitan areas 15 percent, 
for a total of 38 percent.  As William Frey and others have noted, the U.S. is undergoing a 
sorting process in which the native born population is distancing itself from the immigrant urban 
centers, but it is also undergoing a process in which the second generation is also slowly 
diffusing away from the zones of initial immigrant settlement.
New York is an excellent site to study the second generation both because of the large 
concentration of foreign stock, but also because of the hetereogeneity of origins of New York’s 
immigrant population. Table 4 shows that only about 40% of  New York’s 7.5 million residents 
are native stock, while more than a third are foreign born and almost a quarter are second 
generation.  While this combined foreign stock total of 60 percent is well shy of the 78 percent 
reached in 1900, it is a larger fraction than at any time since 1930.   Befitting the city’s role as 
ground zero for previous waves of immigration, the city’s first and second generation 
immigrants are racially diverse:  31 percent white, 20 percent black, 14 percent Asian, and 35 
percent Hispanic.  In other words, each racial group, including whites and blacks, have 
substantial shares of first and second generation immigrants.  Indeed, blacks, at only 53.5 
percent native born, are the most “American” of New York City’s minority groups. .
When we look only at the “new” second generation, however, we get a somewhat 
different picture.  This group is defined as descendants of those who migrated to the U.S. after 
the reform of immigration laws in 1965.  Such a “new” second generation person could 
therefore be only 32 years old in 1998.  As Table 5 shows, just over half (54 percent) of the 
total second generation falls into this “new second generation category” and they are 
overwhelmingly still in their pre-adult years.  About one out of every eight second generation 
individuals are in the baby boom age group, suggesting that their parents came to the U.S. just 
before or after World War II, while one out of five are aged 65 or older, suggesting that their 
foreign born parents arrived, probably as youngsters, in the turn-of-the-century wave of 
migration.  Clearly, in analyzing the current second generation, we want to focus on the “new 
second generation” now entering early adulthood and exclude the older second generation who 
represent previous waves of immigration and who faced a substantially different opportunity 
structure in their early adulthood.
The new second generation has a significantly different racial make-up and spatial 
distribution than the older second generation.  Four out of five of the old second generation are 
non-Hispanic whites and more than half come from European backgrounds; while less than 
one-third of the new second generation are white and only about one in ten comes from a 
European background.  Conversely, almost half (45 percent) of the new second generation are 
Hispanic another 16 percent are Asian, while 7 percent are black.  As one might expect, Table 
6 shows that the new second generation remains in and around the current centers of first 
generation immigration, while the old second generation is disproportionately located in the 
suburbs of New York City, a major magnet for the last waves of migration, and outside the five 
current immigrant gateway cities (where seven out of ten of the old second generation are to be 
found).  
Turning to the new second generation comprised of people who are 32 years old or 
younger in 1998, we find some 16 million people, almost half (44 percent) of whom are located 
in the five big immigrant gateway metropolitan areas.  Within these metropolitan areas, they are 
roughly evenly split between the central cities and suburbs (see Table 6), which means they are 
more suburbanized than their first generation parents but still far less suburbanized than 
natives, especially native born whites.  It is interesting to note, in Table 7, that the racial make-
up of the new second generation in the New York metro area, though more black, otherwise 
roughly approximates that of the U.S. as a whole, while that of the other gateway cities is 
substantially more Hispanic and less white than the national total.  The New York metro area, 
with 7.5 percent of the U.S. population, is home to 13.2 percent of the new second generation. 
Table 8 shows that the new second generation resident in the New York metro area is 
somewhat better educated than that of the other gateway cities or the rest of the U.S., while 
Table 9 shows that the new second generation in metropolitan New York is both somewhat 
poorer and somewhat richer than in the rest of the country.  Tables 8 and 9 both show a 
sharper difference between central city and metropolitan second generation residence on 
education and income than is characteristic of either the gateway cities or the nation as a 
whole.
Thus we concluded, based on these demographic characteristics, that a study of the 
second generation in New York City could include groups from all four of the major racial/ethnic 
groups present in todays immigrant streams--Hispanic, Black, White and Asian.  We also 
concluded that the study needed to include both central city and suburban residents in order not 
to only include lesser educated and lower income respondents.
Geographic Characteristics of the Second Generation in New York
One of the most important reasons for undertaking this study is that the Census and 
other published sources tell us much more about the foreign-born than about their offspring. 
The Census stopped asking people about their parents' birthplace in 1970, substituting a 
question on ancestry that was essentially an attitude variable.  We do know that a large number 
of foreign born have migrated to the region since 1965;  in 1990, 3.8 million of the 27 county 
consolidated metropolitan statistical area's 19.8 million residents were foreign born;  in New 
York City, the concentration was substantially higher.  Almost three out of four had arrived since 
1965.  
We also know that the children of these immigrants constitute a large population.  Some 
were born in the home country and remained there for varying lengths of time before joining 
their parents or other family members here.  Many others were born here.  The 1990 Public Use 
Microdata Sample file (PUMS) allows us to examine the native born children living with at least 
one foreign-born parent.  (As they age and move out of their parents' homes, the statistical 
system loses the ability to identify them as members of the second generation.)  The region's 
total population of 1-17 year olds was 4.549 million in 1990;  of these, 815 thousand, or almost 
one fifth, were born in the 50 states but lived with at least one foreign-born parent.  Another 152 
thousand were foreign born but grew up mostly in the U.S., making for a 1-17 year old second 
generation of almost one million.
Among the region's 3.960 million 18-30 year olds, 214 thousand were native born 
individuals still living with their foreign born parents.  In addition, 151 thousand had arrived in 
the U.S. by age 12, had lived here ten years, and thus could be identified as the 1.5 generation, 
for a combined total of 8.48 percent of the 18-30 cohort.  Since more native born 18-30 year 
olds live outside their families of origin than inside, there are presumably another 200 thousand 
or so second generation 18-30 year olds living away from their foreign born parents, leading to 
a combined second generation of roughly 565 thousand people in 1990, or 14.2 percent of the 
total cohort, or one in seven. 
Everything we know about the new immigration suggests that the experience of this 
second generation will vary strongly by region of origin, as well as by gender, race, class, and 
other important dimensions of the social structure.  At the same time, one or two groups do not 
dominate the immigrant second generation in metropolitan New York.  The single largest ethnic 
group, Dominicans, accounts for only 9.5 percent of the combined second and 1.5 generation 
18-30 year olds;  Jamaicans constitute 6.4 percent, while all Anglophone West-Indians together 
constitute 18.2 percent.  Mainland Chinese are 8.6 percent and the children of all foreign-born 
Chinese (including those from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and elsewhere) are 12.1 percent.  In 
addition we are surveying Russian Jews and Colombians, Ecuadorans and Peruvians. 
Together, these groups  represent 39 percent of combined second and 1.5 generation 
population of those aged 18-30. 
These groups vary in theoretically important ways. West Indians, an English speaking 
immigrant group, are generally classified as “black” by U.S. standards.  One of the two Spanish 
speaking groups, the racially mixed Dominicans, is the region’s largest and poorest single 
immigrant nationality.  We compare them to South Americans who, during the immigrant 
generation, have more European ancestry, have lighter skin tones, and who have 
geographically and economically differentiated themselves from darker and poorer Dominicans. 
The Chinese constitute by far the largest Asian group in the region and include a wide variety of 
human and economic capital levels in the immigrant generation.  Immigrants from Hong Kong 
and Taiwan generally arrive with much higher levels of English proficiency and education, 
whereas many immigrants from the Peoples Republic of China come from peasant 
backgrounds and with far lower levels of formal education. This group constitutes the clearest 
example of an "ethnic enclave" in New York.  They thus have much to tell us how the presence 
of enclaves effects the second generation.  
The proposed sample groups build upon Census ancestry and birthplace designations. 
Although Census categories reference nation states, these designations often poorly capture 
"nationality" and ethnicity as New Yorkers understand them.  (In the Dominican case, however, 
ethnicity and nationality closely coincide this group is sufficiently large to allow efficient 
sampling on its own.) 
We define "West Indian" to include all people descended from those born in the 
Anglophone Caribbean:  the thirteen Caricom member nations (including the mainland 
countries of Guyana and Belize), Caribbean British colonies, the Dutch Caribbean islands 
where most people speak English and are descended from immigrants from the British West 
Indies (i.e. Aruba but not Suriname), and English speaking Panamanians descended from 
British speaking West Indians (the Panamanian census estimates that 14.5% of its population 
is West Indian, but they have long been over represented among immigrants to New York).  We 
do not include English speaking West Indian minority immigrants from predominantly Hispanic 
nations, such as the East Coast Creoles from the Blue Fields area of Nicaragua, Garifuna from 
around Livingston in Guatemala, and the descendants of Jamaican immigrants from Limon in 
Costa Rica, etc.) because it is too difficult to separate them from their more numerous Hispanic 
countrymen.
While there are cultural differences among these nationalities, there is good reason to 
see them as a larger group in New York.  West Indian immigrants tend to define themselves 
this way, even if they would not all use the term "West Indian."  They also tend to differentiate 
themselves from both Hispanic Caribbeans and Haitians.  They share an "Afro-Creole" culture 
as well as a heritage of British colonialism.  Many parents of today's second generation came 
from places that were politically united at the time of their immigration, even if they are now 
separate nations.  In New York, they live in the same neighborhoods, share similar niches in the 
occupational structure, and intermarry.  Taken together, West Indians are the largest immigrant 
group in New York. 
The "South American" group of Colombians, Ecuadorians, and Peruvians is a more 
problematic category.  These groups share occupational and residential niches in New York 
and have more in common with each other than with Caribbean Hispanics (or for that matter 
with Mexicans or Central Americans), but there are also considerable historical and cultural 
differences among them. Our pilot data indicate that second generation children of immigrants 
from these nations have some feeling of being a single group, albeit one lacking a clear sense 
of boundaries or even a clearly articulated name.  Most often these young people would 
describe themselves as Hispanic or Spanish, yet they geenrally differentiated themselves from 
either Puerto Ricans (particularly New York born Puerto Ricans) or Dominicans.  We link them 
to achieve large enough population to sample, to enhance the chances of finding eligible 
households in given areas, and to provide a theoretically interesting comparison with 
Dominicans and Puerto Ricans.  We exclude other South American groups because they are 
culturally and linguistically different groups as Brazilians and Argentineans, many of whom are 
Jews of European extraction in New York.  
We include the Russian second generation to get the view of a "white" group.  As well-
educated Caucasians with ties to a well established native ethnic group, we expect this groups 
to have a far less problematic transition compared to minority second generation groups. 
While the immigrant first generation are geographically concentrated, the second 
generation is somewhat more dispersed.   Maps 1 and 1a show that the 18-30 year old cohort 
makes up from 13.8 to 36 percent of the population of the 152 public use microdata areas 
(PUMAs) in metropolitan New York, with the median about 21.5 percent.  PUMAs are 
geographically large and diverse areas, including at least 100 thousand residents, so 
concentration ratios of most groups beside basic racial distinctions will remain fairly low.  At the 
block-group level, we can expect to find much higher levels of concentration among the second 
generation and a better, if not easy, chance to locate them for the survey sample.  Maps 2 and 
2a show that the immigrant second generation ranges from 1.5 percent to 26.7 percent of the 
18-30 total, with the greatest concentration coming in the southern and eastern zones of the 
West Indian community of Flatbush.   Of the 152 Public Use Microdata areas in metropolitan 
New York, those containing large concentrations of households with second generation 
members (three percent or more) are concentrated in New York City and the inner suburban 
counties, including most of New York City (except the East Side, South Brooklyn, and Staten 
Island), Hempstead in Nassau County, White Plains and Mt. Vernon in Westchester, and 
Teaneck-Hackensack, Paterson, the Oranges, Newark, Jersey City, and Elizabeth in New 
Jersey.
Native-born 18-32 year old whites tend to live on the region’s periphery, far away from 
native minorities and the second generation.  Their highest incidence (above 15 percent) is 
farthest away from the central city;  in suburbs where the second generation can be found, their 
incidence is lower.  Still, as the largest group in the metropolitan population, native born whites 
can be found at feasible sampling levels, more than five percent of all households, even in 
these areas.  Households with native born blacks aged 18-30 are concentrated in the central 
cities and mirror the pattern of whites.  Households with mainland born Puerto Rican 18-30 year 
olds are diffused through the areas between concentrations of whites and blacks.  Nowhere do 
these households reach a particularly high incidence (3.9 percent is the maximum, compared to 
26.3 percent for whites and 21.5 percent for native blacks), but the highest incidence areas may 
be found in the South Bronx, Bushwick, and Sunset Park.  Lower concentrations are found in 
the inner ring suburbs.
Since the immigrant second generation target groups are smaller and less concentrated 
than the native comparison groups, their incidence rates are lower even where they are most 
concentrated. Maps 4 and 4a show the West Indian concentrations.The West Indian second 
generation is the most segregated of the target second generation populations;  the highest 
West Indian second generation incidence is 17.2 percent in Flatbush in Brooklyn.  It is also 
found at fairly high concentrations throughout central Brooklyn, Southeast Queens, the northern 
Bronx, and in Hempstead and Jersey City.  
Maps 6 and 6a show the Dominican concentrations. The highest concentration of the 
Dominican second generation, 10.2 percent, occurs in Washington Heights, were the first 
generation is also most concentrated.  They live at lower concentrations (but still above one 
percent) in the Lower East Side, Sunset Park and Bushwick in Brooklyn, and Elmhurst and 
Jackson Heights in Queens.  Maps 3 and 3a show the ranges for the Chinese, with the 
maximum PUMA-level concentration being 11.3 percent, found in Manhattan's traditional 
Chinatown. The Chinese second generation is concentrated in Chinatown, where it reaches 7.8 
percent of all households, and is present at the one- to three-percent range in South Brooklyn 
and Corona, Elmhurst, a Flushing in Queens.  Maps 7 and 7a show the Colombian-Ecuadorian-
Peruvian concentrations. The Colombian, Ecuadoran, and Peruvian second generation is most 
concentrated (3.8 percent) in Queens, with other concentrations in Jersey City.
Two-Wave Telephone Sampling Strategy
Based on the experience of the pilot survey, we undertook the telephone survey through 
a two-stage sampling methodology.  In the first stage, we used random digit dialing (RDD) to 
screen 30,000 households within the designated sampling area.  Survey firms can determine in 
advance which banks of telephone numbers are active;  to a considerable degree, especially 
outside New York City, telephone numbers cluster by geography, enabling us to select a given 
geographic area as a sampling frame.  Within the sampling area, this large scale screening will 
provide us with an accurate overall picture of the distribution of households containing 18-32 
year olds by race, ethnicity, nativity, and nativity of parents.  One major virtue of this approach 
is it includes low-incidence cases of each group.  We will know the overall incidence of 
households containing the various specific 18-32 year old groups we wish to study as well as 
their specific geographic concentrations.  If properly structured, this screening should provide 
sufficient eligible cases to complete interviews with the native born comparison groups and the 
largest second generation group (West Indians).  It will also lead to completed interviews with 
lesser numbers of the other target groups.  Finally, the first wave will identify telephone 
numbers of eligible second generation households from which to conduct the second phase. 
As of March 1999 we have completed the first phase, and are about to begin the targeted 
phase of calling.
In the second wave of screening, we will make screening calls using random 
permutations of the last three digits of the telephone numbers of those already determined to 
be eligible.  The number of screens for each group will be determined by the number of 
interviews which remain to be completed and the completion ratio obtained in the first round. 
This second round of screening calls will yield eligible cases in a pattern that mirrors the 
underlying concentration of the target second generation group.  If a group is relatively 
geographically concentrated, the yield from the second round of screening calls will be 
substantially higher than the first.  The first wave of screening interviews will tell us how to 
weight each of these cases in the final analysis.  To limit the cost exposure to making many 
fruitless second-stage screening calls from telephone numbers of those who happen to live in 
low incidence areas, we will review the “productivity” of the different screening numbers after 
one-third of the second round screening has been done and eliminate numbers that are 
producing few or no eligible cases.  In this way, the second round of screening calls and 
interviews will be more targeted on the remaining groups and allow us to complete the required 
number of interviews.
  We recognize that a telephone survey is biased against non-telephone households and 
over represents households with more than one telephone line.  We will address both problems 
by asking each household if they have more than one line and whether a non-telephone 
household regularly uses their telephone.  We seek to interview these latter households at that 
telephone, at another time when they can call in, or in person.  In addition to obtaining a more 
representative sample, this information will help us to weight cases appropriately.  In the pilot 
phase, one South American and two Dominican households out of those screened reported that 
another household used their phone because they lacked one of their own.  In general, this two-
stage approach will provide a sample of the entire second generation and our specific study 
groups that will represent the entire range of concentration and neighborhood circumstances in 
which they live.  We also believe, based on our experience in the pilot study, described below, 
that it will provide better quality data.
We considered four alternative geographies from which to construct our sample: A) the 
27 county metropolitan area, B) the 13 county inner metropolitan area (New York City, 
Rockland, Westchester, and Nassau counties, and the five northeastern New Jersey counties), 
C) the 47 Public Use Microdata Areas where the target group incidence was three percent or 
more, and D) New York City minus Staten Island plus the eight suburban PUMAs where the 
target group incidence was three percent or more. .
We chose alternative D for several reasons.  Of the two options, it retains a larger share 
of both the target populations and the native minority groups.  It overcomes the problem that it 
is difficult to target telephone numbers geographically within New York City, since people can 
take their telephone numbers with them when they move and PUMA and zipcode boundaries 
overlap less.  Finally, many low concentration PUMAs in New York City are adjacent to second 
generation concentrations and may have received more of them since the 1990 Census, now 
seven years old.
Opting for alternative D and a first wave of 30,000 screening calls has yielded sufficient 
eligible cases to complete the white, black, and West Indian samples.  (Our goal is to sample 
400 cases of all of the groups, except 800 Chinese and 300 Russian Jews3).  It will also give us 
a substantial start on the Puerto Rican cases.   Since the second round of seed calls will 
eliminate all the sampling units (PUMA) that produced no eligible cases in the first round, its 
yield will be substantially higher for the remaining groups.  In addition, as discussed above, we 
will eliminate unproductive seed numbers after a third of the second screening has been 
completed.  As a result, we estimate that the second round screening will achieve a 
concentration level that averages the first round concentration levels and those of the three 
most concentrated PUMAs for each group as given in the 1990 Census.  This allows us to 
estimate the number of additional screening calls needed for each group so that we can budget 
the telephone survey. 
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Ideally we would have liked to sample 400 Russian Jews but we only received funding for 
300 interviews.
Potential Sample Bias
Narrowing our sample frame in this way introduces the obvious possibility of biasing our 
sample to some degree.  To determine whether this might occur, we used the 1990 PUMS data 
to examine how our three native born groups and five second generation groups differ within 
the two geographies (inside the proposed sample frame versus outside the sample frame).  We 
note that the vast majority of the immigrant second generation lives within the proposed sample 
frame, ranging from a low of 71.9 percent of the Colombians, Ecuadorans, and Peruvians, to a 
high of 88.9 percent of Dominicans.  The proposed sample frame will thus necessarily 
encompass the great bulk of the second generation experience.  It also captures the bulk of the 
native black and Puerto Rican experience, though not the native white experience.
As might be expected, those who live outside the sample frame tend to live in 
households with higher incomes.  Yet the divergence is not large.  The mean household 
incomes inside the sample area are four-fifths of those outside for whites and blacks and 
seventy percent or more for Puerto Ricans, West Indians, and South Americans.  There is no 
difference for Haitian second generation young adults.  The differences are most pronounced 
for Dominicans and Chinese, but even for these groups, those in the sample area live in 
households that, on average, earn two-thirds as much as those who live outside.  (Remember 
that relatively few of these second generation groups live outside the sample area.)  
Table 10 shows household income distribution by group.  Predictably, a few percentage 
points more second generation individuals inside the sample area live in low income 
households than outside, with the greatest disparity among Puerto Ricans and Dominicans. 
Ten to twenty percentage points fewer second generation individuals live in high income 
households inside the sample area compared to those outside, with the disparities being largest 
for Chinese, Dominicans, and South Americans.  Somewhat surprisingly, the household income 
disparities are consistently smaller for the native born groups.  To put these figures in 
perspective, consider that for Chinese, where the disparity is greatest, approximately 7,600 
second generation young adults inside the sample area live in households with incomes of 
$60,000 or more, while about 3,100 second generation Chinese outside live in such 
households.  The proportion of the latter is higher than for the former, but the underlying 
population is much smaller.  Hence, we will capture the upper income experience among the 
Chinese second generation within the sample area, but it will be slightly under represented. 
Consistent with the income patterns, Table 11 shows that all groups inside the sample 
area are more likely to live in female headed households and all but one are less likely to be in 
the labor force than those outside the sample area.  Except for Dominicans and Puerto Ricans, 
however, the disparities are relatively modest.  Put another way, the likelihood of living in a 
female headed household outside the sample area is surprisingly high.  For the low income 
Hispanic groups, native or immigrant, it appears our sample frame will somewhat under 
represent two-parent families.  To the extent that family form drives second generation 
outcomes, our analysis must be mindful of this potential bias when comparing the Hispanic 
groups to the others.  It should not, however, undermine comparisons among the three 
Hispanic groups, because all three have similar differentials.   (Blacks have high levels of 
female headship outside as well as inside the sample area, while Chinese have low levels in 
both.)
Finally, Table 12 examines educational outcomes.  Surprisingly, some disparities are not 
in the expected direction and the differences are generally small.  South Americans inside the 
sample area are actually more likely to have graduated from high school, while native whites, 
native blacks, Dominicans, and   only for Dominicans does the high school graduate rate 
disparity enter double digits, and none of the groups do for the college graduation rate.  On this 
perhaps most crucial of all outcomes, the potential for sample bias appears to be modest at 
best.
We conclude from this analysis, then, that our sample frame will slightly over represent 
respondents living in poor, female-headed households and slightly under represent 
respondents in high income households.  This bias is differentially large across groups primarily 
for Puerto Ricans and Dominicans living in female-headed, low-income households.  Where our 
analysis focuses on these factors and seeks to draw conclusions about these groups, it needs 
to be qualified with an explicit recognition that the twelve to twenty-five percent of the 
Dominican second generation and Puerto Rican young people who live outside the sample area 
are differentially less likely to live under these conditions.  Otherwise, especially for the crucial 
issue of educational attainment, we do not believe our recommended sample frame will 
introduce significant distortions into our conclusions.  Indeed, even for native whites, most of 
whom are excluded from our sample frame, those living within the sample area are evidently 
remarkably similar to those living outside, at least on the dimensions examined here. 
The Suburban Sample
The Mellon Foundation has awarded us funding specifically for adding a “far-suburban” 
sample of the second generation.  This sample has been added to the phone survey because 
of a concern that the experiences of second generation young adults who live in non-immigrant 
areas differ markedly from those who live within the more frequently studied immigrant 
neighborhoods. This  allowed us to gather data from respondents who are growing up within the 
same broad economic context as their inner city or inner-suburb compatriots.  They will vary in 
theoretically important ways, however, because they will be much more exposed to people who 
are not their co-ethnics, and more generally to native born Americans. According to the March 
1997 CPS sample, these sampling areas have a predominantly native-born white population: 
native blacks make up about 10 percent of the proposed suburban sampling area, and native 
Hispanics 5.5 percent.  Overall, about 1.26 percent of the 18-32 year old individuals will be 
second or 1.5 generation persons from our target study groups.  We identified potential 
Chinese, Dominican, and Colombian-Ecuadoran-Peruvian individuals through the listed 
telephone numbers of households where the customer has a distinctively Chinese or Hispanic 
name.  We identified West Indians by calling in towns where the 1990 Census PUMS and STF4 
files show significant numbers of West Indian households. The suburban sample, which has 
been completed but not yet analyzed included 670 additional respondents.
The Pilot Study
Beginning  in  July  1996,  the  project  team fielded  a  pilot  study that  administered  an 
extensive closed-ended instrument to respondents from all target groups and followed them up 
with in-depth, open-ended interviews.  This pilot study had several purposes:  I) to develop and 
refine instruments for screening eligible households, obtaining life histories, and testing a short 
telephone version of the survey;  ii) to develop and refine a protocol for in-depth, open-ended 
follow-up interviews, iii) to test the validity of our sampling approach and explore alternatives to 
it, iv) to get experience with the difficulty and cost of securing completed interviews with the 
target and comparison populations, and v) to uncover other problems likely to arise when the 
full  study was implemented.   We sought  to complete  270 interviews with  the closed-ended 
instrument and 70 in-depth follow-up interviews with the open-ended instrument. 
In the event, our survey firm completed 98 closed-ended interviews with six immigrant 
groups (20 Chinese, 21 West Indians, 2 Koreans, 12 South Americans, 27 Dominicans, and 17 
Haitians) and 74 with three native born comparison groups (25 white, 25 black, and 24 Puerto 
Rican), for a total of 173.  Project team members conducted 54 in depth, open-ended interviews 
with second generation respondents and 53 with the native comparison groups, for a total of 
107.   Although we completed fewer  closed-ended interviews than initially planned,  owing to 
various difficulties in the field, the pilot phase did an excellent job helping us to create and test 
instruments, identify problems, and develop solutions to them.  It also provided us with an initial 
data  base from which  to  think  about  the  issues  raised in  the  study and further  refine  our 
research instruments.
Methodological Lessons
Both the closed-ended and in-depth survey instruments worked well,  but our effort to 
identify  and  interview  eligible  respondents,  which  was  based  on  in-person  approaches  to 
households in Census tracts  where the first  generation groups lived in high concentrations, 
survey encountered a series of difficulties.  Certain smaller groups proved too difficult to locate, 
notably Koreans and Haitians .   Koreans who were located refused to agree to an interview 
despite  our  concerted  efforts.   As  a  result  we  dropped  Haitians  and  Koreans  as  possible 
groups.
Our  initial  strategy  of  targeting  high  concentration  Census  tracts  also  proved 
problematic.  The 1990 Census was sometimes a poor guide to actual residents in 1997. For 
example,  though  the  1990  Census  indicates  East  Harlem  to  be  highly  Puerto  Rican,  we 
encountered  mainly  recent  Mexican and Central  American  immigrants  in  the  target  census 
tracts.  (Indeed, the CPS estimates that since 1990 the Mexican ancestry population of New 
York  City  has  skyrocketed  six-fold  to  306,000.)  Even where  it  was  accurate,  our  sampling 
method was prone to selection bias.  We did not discover many low incidence cases of the 
target second generation groups as “crossover” samples, and when we did, such as the young 
white Lubavitcher who lived in a West Indian neighborhood, they were of questionable value. 
Our sample also seemed biased toward younger (18-23) respondents.
The  direct  approach  to  individuals’  households  was  also  inefficient.   People  were 
reluctant to open their doors to strangers.  It was often difficult even to gain admission to a point 
from which to ring a doorbell.   Field supervision was also difficult.   Such problems led the 
project team to shift from in-person screening to telephone screening.  We had already been 
screening households in target tracts by telephone where the numbers could be identified.  We 
extended  this  to  making  random  digit  dialing  calls  from  telephone  numbers  of  eligible 
households.  Although RDD screening produced fewer eligible cases per residential telephone 
answered than did households contacted in person, we could attempt many more screening 
calls  in the time it  took  to contact  one household in person.   Refusal  rates among eligible 
households  were  about  the same for  both  methods.   In  the  final  analysis,  our  survey firm 
completed 77 interviews from in person approaches in the target  tracts,  22 from telephone 
screening in the target tracts, and 74 from random digit dialing.   Data quality was good across 
all three methods of screening.
We concluded that we should screen all households by telephone in the full version of 
the survey.  Not only was this more economic, but it would produce a far more random and 
representative sample, not one restricted to high incidence Census tracts.  Sample quality could 
also be enhanced through supervision of a central phone bank, handing off potentially eligible 
households to an appropriate language speaker where necessary.  
From there, it was a short step to deciding to conduct the entire closed-ended interview 
by telephone.  A number of factors prompted this decision.  First, it is efficient to complete a 
survey by phone as soon as an eligible person is identified.  We felt that we could get good 
quality data in a telephone survey since we had already had success with such an instrument in 
the pilot survey.  It collected the bulk of the behavioral or experiential data at the core of the 
long form instrument, mainly sacrificing detailed data on the respondent’s life situation at birth, 
age 6, age 12, and age 18, as well as certain attitudinal batteries.  Finally,  we could better 
collect sensitive information, and get more nuanced responses, in in-depth follow-up interviews.
Substantive Lessons
The pilot  study  interviews  also  gave  us  a  wealth  of  insight  about  what  is  currently 
happening with the second generation.   While we did not  do enough of  these interviews to 
justify statistical analysis, they highlight issues that will be central to the final analysis. 
Some aspects of the labor market experiences of the various first generation immigrant 
groups seem to continue into the second generation, in the sense that in groups where the first 
generation brings social and human capital into the market place, the second generation has 
more favorable  opportunities for  employment.   In  other  ways,  however,  the various second 
generation groups seem more like each other, and like native working class New Yorkers, than 
like their immigrant parents.  Only for the Chinese does the ethnic enclave play a positive role, 
but there is evidence that the second generation will avoid the lower rungs of the enclave if at 
all possible.  
All groups express a strong belief that education, not job experience or "connections," is 
the key to success in today's economy.  Virtually everyone reports that their parents stressed 
the  importance of  education,  but  what  the meaning  of  educational  “success”  varies  greatly 
across the groups.  For some, doing well was simply a matter of graduating from high school; 
for others, it meant getting consistently good grades and going to college.  For West Indians, a 
certain amount of discounting of the efficacy of education took place.  For native whites and 
blacks,  private  and  parochial  schools  often  made  a  key  difference  in  their  educational 
outcomes.  Those who attended parochial schools were less likely to "fall through the cracks" or 
pay a heavy penalty for mistakes than those who attended public schools.  Parents who took 
education seriously and spent time and energy fighting an indifferent educational bureaucracy 
were credited with saving the educational careers of many respondents. 
  Asians respondents made the best use of the resources of the New York City public 
schools  compared  to  other  groups,  including  whites.   None of  the  Chinese  respondents 
attended  private  or  parochial  schools,  but  half  had  attended  an  elite  magnet  high  school 
(Stuyvesant, Bronx Science and Brooklyn Tech) and the rest attended the better New York City 
public high schools (i.e.. Cardozo, LaGuardia, Midwood).  Chinese parents seem to have better 
access  to  information  regarding  high  schools,  which  is  partially  transmitted  through  ethnic 
networks. On the other hand Chinese respondents also benefitted from being less residentially 
segregated than other groups.  In sharp contrast to other immigrant groups and to native blacks 
and whites, many Asian respondents remembered their high school years fondly and noted that 
their friends were more racially and ethnically diverse in high school than in college or since.
  
The educational picture for the Haitian, West Indian and Dominican respondents, like 
that of native blacks and Hispanics (and, to a considerable degree, working class native whites) 
is less bright.  With few exceptions these respondents attended segregated public or parochial 
schools  with  their  co-ethnics,  or  with  native  minorities.    Although  some  had  applied  to 
specialized high schools, none of those we interviewed had been admitted. Even those who 
had  been  enrolled  in  honors  classes  in  High  School  and  went  on  to  college  often  found 
themselves unprepared for college work.  Many "1.5" generation students reported having been 
placed in the wrong grade when they arrived.  
 A typical pattern was that a good student who received awards in elementary school or 
junior  high became a mediocre student  in high school.   Many respondents  graduated from 
vocational programs and a number participated in a cooperative work training program where 
students attend school for two days and work the other three.
These groups had a complicated attitude towards education.  On the one hand, almost 
all of them stressed the positive value of education, which they reflexively affirmed as the surest 
route towards upward mobility.  Indeed, if we had only conducted the closed-ended survey, we 
would have concluded that all respondents believed strongly in education, with little variation 
across groups.  Yet, when probed, West Indian, Haitian, and Dominican respondents revealed 
considerable skepticism about the true value of educational credentials in the face of a racially 
divided job market.
Except for the Chinese, educational attainment varied markedly by gender among all 
groups.  Women consistently attain higher levels.  All the women respondents had graduated 
high school and most had attended college.  By contrast, several eighteen and nineteen-year-
old men were still in high school and many were overage for their grade when they graduated 
or left school.
There  are  several  possible  explanations  for  this  difference.  It  may be that  in  many 
immigrant communities (as in working class native white communities) education is considered 
to  be  more  important  for  women,  or  that  educational  success  is  seen  as  "feminine." 
Overcrowded inner city public and parochial schools may also reward traditionally "feminine" 
traits such as cooperativeness,  compliance and passivity.   Young minority women may face 
less overt discrimination than young men and may cope with discrimination and ethnic conflict 
in less self-destructive ways. 
Many respondents  offered  the  paradoxical  explanation  that  young  women  are  more 
closely tied to the home.  Family arrangements where a single mother (the most common family 
form  among  the  Caribbean  groups)  is  working  six  or  seven  days  a  week  reinforces  the 
gendered division of labor in domestic chores among siblings.  A young woman growing up in 
this environment may have to assume adult responsibilities for younger siblings at an early age. 
While such arrangements undoubtedly take time away from studies, respondents felt these they 
also helped their school work by forcing maturity on young women and keeping them away from 
the temptations of  the "street."   Boys were generally exempt from such responsibilities and 
were often encouraged to be more independent,  but  that  independence was often counter-
productive  for  school  work.   Many immigrant  families  feel  a  strong  need to  "protect"  girls, 
particularly from early sexual activity and pregnancy, but also from violence.  While boys are, in 
fact,   more  likely  to  be  the  victims  of  violence,  they  are  generally  felt  not  to  need  such 
protection: 
The academically successful Dominican, West Indian and Haitian students resembled 
Asian  students.   Like  Asians,  they  sought  out  the  best  public  or  parochial  schools.   Yet 
residential  segregation  made  this  more  difficult,  as  the  "zoned"  schools  where  these 
respondents lived were almost always inferior.  Catholic schools were often the best option for 
the academically oriented,  even among non-Catholics (a pattern we also saw among native 
blacks).  
Most native minority respondents and the large majority of the Haitian, West Indian and 
Dominican respondents had lived in some form of "non-traditional" family before the age of 18. 
Only the South American respondents tended to have a full time, "stay at home" mother for a 
significant portion of their childhood.  In many cases, family trajectories were too complicated to 
be picked up even in a survey instrument designed to capture them.  Marriages broke up and 
came back together, half siblings and fictive kin were common in some groups, other related 
adults joined and left  immigrant households, etc.  Families immigrated in stages, with some 
children remaining with relatives "back  home" while  others came to the U.S.   The in-depth 
interviews proved better at capturing this complexity. 
Among  the  native  groups,  family-of-origin  structure  explain  little  of  the  respondent's 
outlooks  and  trajectories.   Respondents  seemed  more  concerned  with  the  quality  of 
relationships within the family.   For themselves,  most  native respondents viewed egalitarian 
marriages as the ideal, but few were sanguine about the possibility of meeting this standard. 
Most have high standards of what constitutes a "good" marriage and many would rather "go it 
alone" and even raise children alone than be confined to an unhappy relationship.  
Asian and South American immigrants had more traditional ideas about marriage.  Most 
were raised in two parent families and many thought a strict division of labor within the family, 
particularly concerning child care, made sense.  Traditional ideas seem to be breaking down, 
however.  Few Asian respondents were, in fact, married and most reported being in no hurry to 
do so.  Most Asian women had established independent careers.  South American respondents 
were the most likely to be married.  Here, too, women wanted to be more independent than 
their mothers had been (although this seems more an ideal than a fact.) 
West Indian and Haitian respondents combine traditional notions about male and female 
roles  with  a strong  assumption  that  women should be able to  fend for  themselves.   Many 
women expressed a desire to avoid premature child-rearing, although this may reflect the ideal 
more than the practice.   For Dominican second and 1.5 generation respondents,  desires to 
avoid premature child-bearing often come into conflict with seeing having children as a rite of 
passage into adulthood. While the  traditional household of a working father and a child-rearing 
mother is clearly the ideal among this group, most doubt they will obtain for themselves.  A 
number of the Dominican respondents had had children outside of marriage.
While most immigrant respondents pointed to clear difference between their culture of 
origin and that of the U.S. mainstream, they generally had little clear conception of "American" 
as a distinct culture.   Indeed, they used the word "American" as a contrast to their parent's 
culture, not a meaningful cultural category in its own right.  "American" ways were often seen as 
the absence of culture!  When asked what makes an "American," most respondents spoke in 
narrow legal terms about the rights of  citizenship and, in a few cases, of  civic participation. 
Many felt  comfortable seeing themselves as part of their parent's community but legally and 
politically "American."
Almost all second generation respondents saw a clear difference between how children 
are  raised  and  family  issues  dealt  with  in  their  parent's  culture  as  contrasted  with  the 
“American” approach.  Many said their parent's culture placed a higher priority on education 
than did American families.  West Indian respondents in particular consistently emphasized the 
"discipline" of West Indian families as opposed to the moral laxity of American households: 
While the pilot interviews lend some support to the notion that poorer, minority second 
generation  individuals  will  adopt  the  putatively  "oppositional"  culture  of  poor  native  African 
Americans and Puerto Ricans, our interviews with the native white comparison group suggest 
that working class whites can also have what might be seen as a self-destructive "oppositional" 
culture.  Many such attitudes and behaviors, including drug use and drug dealing, devaluing 
formal education, the use of violence, strong peer group orientation, and disrespect for formal 
authority  were  common among  the  native  whites  we  interviewed.   Until  recently,  however, 
working class whites had access to decent jobs despite these attributes, a fact that might lead 
us to question causal role of "oppositionalism" per se.  
In discussing ethnic stereotypes and their  experiences of  discrimination,  respondents 
consistently reported the greatest hostility between groups that are relatively closely positioned 
in residential space and labor market position.  West Indians report conflicts with Haitians and 
African Americans, for example, and South Americans with Puerto Ricans.  
  When Black and Latino immigrant respondents discussed white and Asian prejudice, it 
was highly specific to employers and, most often, store owners.  The experience of face to face 
prejudice may be more common among better off respondents.  We were initially surprised at 
how few of the poorer and younger males reported having been the victims of discrimination. 
However, the in depth interviews made clear that this was due to a lack of contact with whites.  
 It has been widely argued that the maintenance of transnational ties may have important 
consequences for the second generation.  Some speculate that we are seeing the creation of 
sustained,  multi-generational  transnational  communities.   The pilot  data,  however,  does not 
support  this  view.   Many second and 1.5 generation  respondents  had visited  their  parents 
homelands,  but  in most cases only for  short  visits.   Members of  all  groups saw visiting the 
"home" country as an enjoyable experience and most spoke about these visits with nostalgia. 
Yet few wanted to live there on a sustained basis.    Many disparaged the lack of amenities in 
the home country.
To summarize, the pilot phase data, while inconclusive in some cases, points strongly to 
the  importance  of  parental  experiences,  the  social  and  cultural  resources  of  the  national 
groups,  and the  structural  context  of  reception.   All  clearly  shape  the  incorporation  of  the 
various  second  generation  groups.   High  rates  of  parental  self-employment  and  co-ethnic 
employment seem to have had positive effects for the second generation Chinese, but more as 
a step into the mainstream economy than as a sustained, multi-generational "ethnic enclave." 
Few second generation Chinese seem interested in entering "Chinese" industries.  Moderate 
rates of self-employment and high participation in the ethnic economy had little effect on the 
often downwardly mobile Dominicans. Young people in all groups, including the native groups, 
have seen their life chances profoundly shaped by the changes in the urban economy. Service 
sector employment predominates across the board, even among groups whose parents were 
largely concentrated in blue collar industries. This has increased the importance of educational 
credentials and perhaps of cultural capital.  
Those groups unambiguously defined as "black"  in  the North American context  (i.e. 
West Indians and many Dominicans) seem to have less access to both job and educational 
opportunities  and  to  many public  institutions.   This  is  due,  at  least  in  part,  to  the  racially 
segregated  housing  market.   The  second  generation  is  often  keenly  aware  of  racial 
discrimination, yet modes of coping with discrimination vary markedly by gender. Gender also 
has a huge impact on educational outcomes, and possibly on ethnic identity. The ambiguous 
position of Dominicans with regard to native whites and New York's Puerto Rican community, 
merits  further  exploration.  While  there  is  some  evidence  of  an  emergent  pan-Latino 
consciousness, the variation between Latino groups leads us to question the usefulness of the 
"Latino"  category for  social  analysis.   Ethnic  conflict  among the various second  generation 
groups and with native minorities has had at least as powerful an impact on young people's 
daily lives as discrimination by native whites, with whom members of many groups have little 
daily contact.
The second generation groups vary widely in family structure.  Yet ideas about family 
and family obligations seem remarkably consistent across the second generation groups and 
contrast sharply with those of the native respondents.  While natives often expressed fear and 
regret about being "a disappointment" to their families, it was usually because, the respondent 
had  not  "achieved"  enough  to  justify  parental  sacrifice.   Among  the  second  generation, 
however, the young people often felt that they were sacrificing for the family. Many had turned 
down opportunities for individual upward mobility in order to fulfill family obligations. 
The Current and Future Phases of the Project
We have completed the 670 far  suburban phone interviews and will  begin analyzing 
them  soon.   We  have  completed  the  first  30,000  screening  calls  and  completed  all  400 
interviews  with  the  native  whites,  blacks,  Puerto  Ricans  and  West  Indians  and  we  have 
substantial numbers of completed interviews with the remaining second generation groups. We 
are therefore about half way through completing the 3,500 structured telephone interviews in 
the city and near suburbs.   Since October we also have had a team of ten graduate students 
doing in depth interviews with  people who have completed the phone interview. By the end of 
the summer of 1999 we will complete in-person, open-ended, in-depth follow-up interviews with 
480 respondents.   These life  history interviews will  capture the ways in  which  the subjects 
construct the narrative of their educational careers, work histories, ethnic consciousness, and 
the like.  Conducted over several hours, they will enable us to elicit detailed information about 
intergroup relations and conflicts,  experiences with schools and employers,  interactions with 
parents, and sensitive issues such as involvement with drugs or drug dealing.  It is difficult, if 
not impossible, to capture these issues successfully in a closed-ended telephone interview. 
Our open-ended instrument parallels the closed-ended questionnaire but is designed to 
elicit  the  subject's  own  words  about  such  complex  issues  as  life  aspirations  or  situational 
identities. In-depth interviews allow us to discover the processes that link causes and effects 
found in the larger survey.  For example, while the telephone survey asks respondents about 
their  present  job and how they found it  (i.e.  "Through an add in the newspaper,"  "Through 
friends," etc.), the open-ended interview asks for a verbatim narrative of this process, with room 
for whatever information the subject perceived to be important to understanding these events.
We  are  currently  in  the  process  of  choosing  six  ethnographers  to  begin  work  in 
September  of  1999  in  six  strategic  sites  in  the  city  and  suburbs.  The  proposed  research 
program  will  build  on  the  survey results  by giving  close  and  extended  examination  to  the 
settings in which second generation immigrants live, work and come to understand their lives. 
By sensitizing researchers to the contexts in which the immigrants function, carefully crafted 
ethnographic work can help us make sense of the survey data, add texture to our analysis, and 
raise and address issues which lie beyond the reach of survey research. 
 While the ethnographies will deal with the same populations studied in the survey, they 
will focus on the social and spatial settings for interactions among individuals rather than on 
individuals per se.  In settings such as workplaces, neighborhoods, political organizations, and 
schools, researchers will explore how the issues raised in the survey play out in everyday life, 
especially  how  the  second  generation  interacts  with  first  generation  immigrants  and  with 
natives.  The unit of analysis will be nodes of interaction rather than populations.  Such studies 
will allow us to go beyond the second generation's own understanding of its experience and 
contextualize these understandings within a broader field of social action.   
TABLE 1
Race by Immigrant Status
Resident Population, United States, 1998
(row percents except for right total column, which is column percent) 
Foreign 
Born
Noncitizen
Foreign 
Born
Citizen
Second
Generation
Native
Stock
TOTAL
NH White 3,314,484 3,396,923 15,340,682 169,625,637 191,677,726
1.7% 1.8% 8.0% 88.5% 71.4%
NH Black 1,086,494 687,507 1,263,759 30,568,278 33,606,038
3.2% 2.0% 3.8% 91.0% 12.5%
NH Native Am 40,879 23,432 114,162 1,860,540 2,039,013
2.0% 1.1% 5.6% 91.2% 0.8%
NH Asian 3,367,449 2,735,247 2,796,144 1,350,039 10,248,879
32.9% 26.7% 27.3% 13.2% 3.8%
Hispanic 8,620,182 2,986,537 8,581,125 10,533,772 30,721,616
28.1% 9.7% 27.9% 34.3% 11.5%
TOTAL 16,429,488 9,829,646 28,095,872 213,938,266 268,293,272
6.1% 3.7% 10.5% 79.7% 100.0%
Source:  Annual  Demographic  Supplement,  March  1998  Current  Population  Survey,  Final 
Weights
TABLE 2
Immigrant Status of Total Population
Eleven Largest Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 1998
(row percents except for right total column, which is column percent) 
CMSA Foreign Born
Noncitizen
Foreign Born
Citizen
Second
Generation
Native
Stock
TOTAL
New York 2,798,676 1,844,695 3,822,126 11,650,636 20,116,113
13.9% 9.2% 19.0% 57.9% 7.5%
Los Angeles 3,182,029 1,522,847 3,449,492 7,650,973 15,805,341
20.1% 9.6% 21.8% 48.4% 5.9%
Chicago 679,107 417,619 1,183,421 5,947,001 8,227,148
8.3% 5.1% 14.4% 72.3% 3.1%
Wash DC/Balt 503,862 323,169 679,132 5,697,503 7,203,666
7.0% 4.5% 9.4% 79.1% 2.7%
San Francisco 831.662 609,226 1,214,911 3,956,203 6,612,002
12.6% 9.2% 18.4% 59.8% 2.5%
Philadelphia 232,562 160,971 633,452 4,982,887 6,009,872
3.9% 2.7% 10.5% 82.9% 2.2%
Detroit 186,465 173,270 675,073 4,619,501 5,654,309
3.3% 3.1% 11.9% 81.7% 2.1%
Boston 329,453 183,177 849,464 4,127,195 5,489,289
6.0% 3.3% 15.5% 75.2% 2.0%
Dallas-Ft 
Worth
357,015 151,417 485,677 4,213,293 5,207,402
6.9% 2.9% 9.3% 80.9% 1.9%
Houston 428,992 251,926 492,297 3,118,027 4,621,212
9.3% 5.5% 10.7% 74.6% 1.7%
Miami 805,786 614,091 795,380 1,507,037 3,722,294
21.6% 16.5% 21.4% 40.5% 1.
Source: see above
. Table 3
Race by Immigrant Status, New York City Residents, 1998
Foreign 
Born
Noncitizen
Foreign 
Born
Citizen
Second
Generation
Native
Stock
TOTAL
NH White 437,578 308,668 657,228 1,218,156 2,621,629
16.7 11.8 25.1 46.5 34.9
NH Black 351,903 245,376 317,787 1,052,075 1,967,141
17.9 12.5 16.2 53.5 26.2
NH Asian 295,658 199,819 122,237 1,819 619,532
47.7 32.3 19.7 0.3 8.2
Hispanic 672,167 294,550 610,991 729,668 2,307,376
29.1 12.8 26.5 31.6 30.7
TOTAL 1,762,231 1,048,413 1,708,243 3,001,718 7,520,603
23.4 13.9 22.7 39.9 100.0
Source:  Annual  Demographic  Supplement,  March  1998  Current  Population  Survey, 
Final Weights
TABLE 4
Region of U.S. by Immigrant Generation Status
U.S. Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population, 1998
Region of U.S. Immigrant Generation              
 FB 
Noncitiz
en
FB 
Citizen
Second 
Generatio
n
Native 
Stock Total
New York City 176223
1
104841
3
1708242 3001717 7520603 
row 23.4% 13.9% 22.7% 39.9% 100.0% 
column 10.7% 10.7% 5.8% 1.4% 2.8% 
Rest of NYCMSA 103644
5
796282 2232987 8529816 12595530 
 8.2% 6.3% 17.7% 67.7% 100.0% 
 6.3% 8.1% 7.6% 4.0% 4.7% 
Other Gateway Cities 286333
2
130913
3
2695230 7077619 13945314 
 20.5% 9.4% 19.3% 50.8% 100.0% 
 17.4% 13.3% 9.2% 3.3% 5.2% 
Rest of Gateway 
CMSAs
294405
0
208610
5
4477283 14483997 23991435 
 12.3% 8.7% 18.7% 60.4% 100.0% 
 17.9% 21.2% 15.2% 6.8% 8.9% 
Rest of U.S. 782343
1
458971
5
18246869 17958037
7
21024039
2 
 3.7% 2.2% 8.7% 85.4% 100.0% 
 47.6% 46.7% 62.1% 84.4% 78.4% 
TOTAL U.S. 164294
89
982964
8
29360611 21267352
6
26829327
4 
Region of U.S. Immigrant Generation              
 6.1% 3.7% 10.9% 79.3% 100.0% 
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source:  Annual  Demographic  Supplement,  March  1998  Current  Population  Survey,  Final 
Weights
TABLE 5
Immigrant Generation by Age Categories
U.S. Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population, 1998
Age Immigrant Generation Status         
 FB
Noncitizen FB Citizen
Second
 Generation
Native 
Stock
 
Total 
1 to 17 2303063 352982 11515826 57495981 71667852 
row 3.2% .5% 16.1% 80.2% 100.0% 
column 14.0% 3.6% 39.2% 27.0% 26.7% 
18 to 32 5875832 1719774 4410010 43475795 55481411 
 10.6% 3.1% 7.9% 78.4% 100.0% 
 35.8% 17.5% 15.0% 20.4% 20.7% 
33 to 52 6005104 4103945 4638366 66530724 81278139 
 7.4% 5.0% 5.7% 81.9% 100.0% 
 36.6% 41.8% 15.8% 31.3% 30.3% 
53 to 64 1304829 1753412 2390936 22291401 27740578 
 4.7% 6.3% 8.6% 80.4% 100.0% 
 7.9% 17.8% 8.1% 10.5% 10.3% 
65+ 940660 1899534 6405474 22879624 32125292 
 2.9% 5.9% 19.9% 71.2% 100.0% 
 5.7% 19.3% 21.8% 10.8% 12.0% 
 TOTAL 16429488 9829647 29360612 212673525 268293272 
 6.1% 3.7% 10.9% 79.3% 100.0% 
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source:  Annual  Demographic  Supplement,  March  1998  Current  Population  Survey,  Final 
Weights
TABLE 6
Region of Residence by New versus Old Second Generation
U.S. Second Generation Population, 1998
Second Generation Status  
 New Old Total
New York City 1169693 538549 1708242 
Row 68.5% 31.5% 100.0% 
Column 7.3% 4.0% 5.8% 
Rest of NYCMSA 944926 1288061 2232987 
 42.3% 57.7% 100.0% 
 5.9% 9.6% 7.6% 
Other Gateway Cities 1946543 748687 2695230 
 72.2% 27.8% 100.0% 
 12.2% 5.6% 9.2% 
Rest of Gateway CMSAs 2930549 1546735 4477284 
 65.5% 34.5% 100.0% 
 18.4% 11.5% 15.2% 
Rest of U.S. 8934125 9312743 18246868 
 49.0% 51.0% 100.0% 
 56.1% 69.3% 62.1% 
Total 15925836 13434775 29360611 
 54.2% 45.8% 100.0% 
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source:  Annual  Demographic  Supplement,  March  1998  Current  Population  Survey,  Final 
Weights
TABLE 7
Region of Residence by Race and Hispanic Origin
U.S. New Second Generation Only
 Race by Hispanic Origin   
 NH White NH Black NH Asian Hispanic  Total
New York City 201777 283572 118323 566020 1169692 
 Row 17.3% 24.2% 10.1% 48.4% 100.0% 
 Column 4.0% 25.5% 4.7% 7.9% 7.3% 
Rest of NYCMSA 440124 115136 145761 243906 944927 
 46.6% 12.2% 15.4% 25.8% 100.0% 
 8.7% 10.4% 5.8% 3.4% 5.9% 
Other Gateway Cities 291817 47478 302677 1302230 1946542 
 15.0% 2.4% 15.5% 66.9% 100.0% 
 5.8% 4.3% 12.1% 18.2% 12.2% 
Rest of Gateway CMSAs 621562 112302 528525 1656515 2930549 
 21.2% 3.8% 18.0% 56.5% 100.0% 
 12.3% 10.1% 21.2% 23.1% 18.4% 
Rest of U.S. 3518304 553779 1402557 3400284 8934125 
 39.4% 6.2% 15.7% 38.1% 100.0% 
 69.3% 49.8% 56.2% 47.4% 56.1% 
Total 5073584 1112267 2497843 7168955 15925835 
 31.9% 7.0% 15.7% 45.0% 100.0% 
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source:  Annual  Demographic  Supplement,  March  1998  Current  Population  Survey,  Final 
Weights
TABLE 8
Region of Residence by Educational Attainment
U.S. New Second Generation Only
 Educational Attainment                          Total 
 18 or
Younger
Less 
Than HS
HS 
Degree
Some 
College
College 
Degree
Advanced 
Degree
  
New York City 752203 125397 46488 177072 50123 18409 1169692 
Row 64.3% 10.7% 4.0% 15.1% 4.3% 1.6% 100.0% 
Column 7.4% 5.9% 4.3% 9.8% 7.6% 10.8% 7.3% 
Rest of NYCMSA 597214 83511 70257 106812 73764 13368 944926 
 63.2% 8.8% 7.4% 11.3% 7.8% 1.4% 100.0% 
 5.9% 3.9% 6.5% 5.9% 11.2% 7.8% 5.9% 
Other Gateway Cities 1332994 257634 100549 163449 70664 21253 1946543 
 68.5% 13.2% 5.2% 8.4% 3.6% 1.1% 100.0% 
 13.2% 12.2% 9.4% 9.1% 10.7% 12.5% 12.2% 
Rest of Gateway CMSAs 1936451 357058 191489 307397 108906 29248 2930549 
 66.1% 12.2% 6.5% 10.5% 3.7% 1.0% 100.0% 
 19.2% 16.8% 17.8% 17.1% 16.5% 17.2% 18.4% 
Rest of U.S. 5484120 1296788 664628 1044716 355740 88134 8934126 
 61.4% 14.5% 7.4% 11.7% 4.0% 1.0% 100.0% 
 54.3% 61.2% 61.9% 58.1% 54.0% 51.7% 56.1% 
Total 10102982 2120388 1073411 1799446 659197 170412 15925836 
 63.4% 13.3% 6.7% 11.3% 4.1% 1.1% 100.0% 
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source:  Annual  Demographic  Supplement,  March  1998  Current  Population  Survey,  Final 
Weights
TABLE 9
Region of Residence by Household Income Categories
U.S. New Second Generation Only
 Household Income Categories    
 $1-14,999 $15-34,999 $35-59,999 $60-74,999 $75,000+  Total
New York City 300843 294069 258474 108883 207425 1169694 
 25.7% 25.1% 22.1% 9.3% 17.7% 100.0% 
 12.0% 6.6% 6.2% 7.0% 6.5% 7.3% 
Rest of NYCMSA 68870 185251 247522 115387 327896 944926 
 7.3% 19.6% 26.2% 12.2% 34.7% 100.0% 
 2.7% 4.1% 5.9% 7.4% 10.2% 5.9% 
Other Gateway Cities 425753 686370 417545 116814 300060 1946542 
 21.9% 35.3% 21.5% 6.0% 15.4% 100.0% 
 17.0% 15.3% 10.0% 7.5% 9.3% 12.2% 
Rest of Gateway CMSAs 352471 732749 748360 326885 770083 2930548 
 12.0% 25.0% 25.5% 11.2% 26.3% 100.0% 
 14.0% 16.3% 18.0% 21.0% 24.0% 18.4% 
Rest of U.S. 1361467 2590650 2489752 887743 1604514 8934126 
 15.2% 29.0% 27.9% 9.9% 18.0% 100.0% 
 54.3% 57.7% 59.8% 57.1% 50.0% 56.1% 
Total 2509404 4489089 4161653 1555712 3209978 15925836 
 15.8% 28.2% 26.1% 9.8% 20.2% 100.0% 
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source:  Annual  Demographic  Supplement,  March  1998  Current  Population  Survey,  Final 
Weights
Table 10
Household Income Distribution Inside and Outside the Proposed Sample Area
Persons 18-30 In Households With Income 
Under $15,000
In - Out In Households With Income 
Over $60,000
In - Out
Group  Inside  Outside Pct pts Inside Outside Pct pts
NH NB Whites 4.5 1.4 3.1 56.4 66.7 -10.3
NH NB Blacks 18.3 9.6 8.7 25.9 35.9 -10.0
Puerto Ricans 29.0 12.7 16.3 13.8 26.6 -12.8
West Indians 8.5 3.0 5.5 33.9 51.0 -17.1
Dominicans 22.4 7.5 14.9 13.1 33.9 -20.8
Chinese 12.7 2.8 9.9 26.0 53.7 -27.7
CPE 10.5 5.0 5.5 23.7 44.4 -20.7
Source: 1990 Census. Public Use Microdata.
Table 11
Household Form and Labor Force Status Inside and Outside the Proposed Sample Area
Persons 18-30 In Female Headed 
Households 
In - Out Not In Labor Force In - Out
Group  Inside  Outside Pct pts Inside Outside Pct pts
NH NB Whites 27.2 16.9 10.3 24.6 19.8 5.8
NH NB Blacks 60.3 46.6 13.7 35.6 28.3 7.3
Puerto Ricans 42.6 23.3 19.3 37.9 26.4 11.3
West Indians 36.2 21.2 15.0 29.2 24.3 4.9
Dominicans 47.7 24.7 23.0 38.1 23.7 14.4
Chinese 11.7 8.4 3.3 39.8 40.6 -0.8
South Americans 30.8 18.7 12.1 26.3 21.7 4.6
Source: 1990 Census. Public Use Microdata.

Table 12
Educational Attainment Inside and Outside the Proposed Sample Area
Persons 18-30 High School Grad In - Out College Grad In - Out
Group  Inside  Outside Pct pts Inside Outside Pct pts
NH NB Whites 30.5 31.5 -1.0 21.8 19.2 2.6
NH NB Blacks 32.6 38.0 -5.4 7.0 6.2 0.8
Puerto Ricans 28.5 33.6 -5.1 5.7 7.2 -1.5
West Indians 31.2 29.1 -2.1 10.8 14.6 -3.8
Dominicans 24.6 36.5 -11.9 5.2 5.1 0.1
Chinese 23.0 26.4 -3.4 21.0 28.8 -7.8
CPE 28.6 27.4 1.2 8.8 12.1 -5.3
Source: 1990 Census. Public Use Microdata.
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